

WARRANT NUMBER: 7-25-24 3w1

THE STATE OF TEXAS           §  
COUNTY OF FORT BEND       §  
268TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT   §

**APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT FOR  
STORED ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS**

I.

COMES NOW, the State of Texas, by and through the requesting peace officer, Ranger Garrett Chapman, and requests that a search warrant be signed, pursuant to Arts. 18.02 (a) (13) and 18B.351- 18B.359 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and, in accordance with, Title 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2703(a) requiring the herein named electronic communications provider to furnish all Meta Platforms, Inc. account records for Facebook account holder: **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594) for the time period of January 21, 2012 to June 21, 2024** including:

Said Electronic Customer Data is more particularly described as:

1. Basic subscriber information, including but not limited to: the user identification number, full name, e-mail addresses associated with the subscriber(s), current and past physical addresses (including city, state, and zip code), screen names, websites, any and all registered mobile telephone numbers associated with the listed account, account or log-on names, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with the listed account, and other personal identifiers;
2. Information about the subscriber's use of Facebook, including but not limited to: billing information, credit card information including account name, account number and expiration date used in conjunction with this account, types of services utilized by the subscriber and the lengths of such services or any other identifying or pertinent records relating to the subscriber, account application information, account access information, user logon information (including secondary user logon names), account usage reports, and any other information both in electronic customer data and written record format, that records the activities of these accounts relating to the subscriber's use of the services offered by Facebook (Meta Platforms, Inc.);
3. All records pertaining to communications between Facebook and any person regarding **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)** including contacts with support services and records of actions taken;
4. Screen names the account holder has added to his/her account, the service they are associated with, and whether these names are hidden or visible on the account;
5. Other accounts and all account information that may be associated with **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)** after it has been identified;

6. Any information that would aid in the identification of who created the **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)** Facebook account;
7. Alternate names the account holder has on the account, including by way of example but not limitation, nicknames or aliases;
8. Email addresses added by the account holder, including email addresses that may have subsequently been removed;
9. A list of IP addresses, dates and times associated with logins and logouts to Facebook account **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)** or any related/connected Meta Platforms, Inc., Instagram, or WhatsApp accounts;
10. Expanded Subscriber Content, including by way of example but not limitation, profile contact information, status update history, shares, notes, wall postings, friend listings to include friends, Facebook user names or IDs, future and past events; date and time stamp of account creation, most recent logins;
11. Stored active sessions, including date, time, device, IP address, machine cookie and browser information;
12. Third-party applications (or “apps”) the account holder subscribes to;
13. A history of the conversations the account holder had on Facebook or Facebook Messenger;
14. All records of communications and messages sent or received by the account holder or through other associated accounts, including but not limited to all direct messages, all chat logs, Facebook messenger communications, video or audio calls and any archived messages;
15. Places the account holder has checked into;
16. A list of people who follow the account holder, including by way of example but not limitation, user name and account information;
17. A list of people the account holder follows, including by way of example but not limitation, user name and account information;
18. Pending, sent and received friend requests, including by way of example but not limitation, user name and account information;
19. A list of the account holder’s friends and close friends, including name, Facebook ID, and Facebook account name;
20. A list of addresses where the account holder has logged into his/her Facebook (Meta Platforms, Inc.) account;
21. The last location associated with an update on this account;



22. A list of the accounts this account holder has linked to his/her Facebook (Meta Platforms, Inc.) account;
23. All archived stories or posts;
24. All posts, photo(s), video(s), or other items "saved" by the account holder;
25. All saved highlights or highlight stories;
26. All comments or likes that the account holder has made on another user's post, story, photo, video, or status update;
27. Networks or groups (affiliations with schools or workplaces) that the account holder belongs to on Meta Platforms, Inc.;
28. A list of pages this account holder administers;
29. Mobile phone numbers the account holder has added to his/her account, including by way of example but not limited to verified mobile numbers he/she has added for security purposes;
30. Photographs, in their original format, the account holder has uploaded to his/her account or shared, as well as, temporary and stored photographs the account holder has shared via chat. The photographs should include metadata information, including but not limited to, the date and time the photo was taken, GPS coordinates, make, model and possibly serial number of the device used;
31. Videos, in their original format, the account holder has uploaded to his/her account, or shared, as well as, temporary and stored videos the account holder has shared via chat. The videos should include metadata information, including by way of example but not limitation, the date and time the photo was taken, GPS coordinates, make, model and possibly serial number of the device used;
32. Posts by the account holder to his/her own timeline, including by way of example but not limitation, photos, videos, and status updates;
33. Posts to someone else's timeline or profile by the account holder, including by way of example but not limitation, photos, videos and status updates;
34. All contacts associated with the username whether derived from a mobile device phonebook or address book, associated Facebook account, or manually searched for and added;
35. All device information associated with the Facebook account including, but not limited to, International Mobile Equipment Identifiers (IMEIs), Mobile Equipment Identifiers (MEIDs), International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI), and Unique Device Identifiers (UDIDs);
36. All images, photos, and videos including all photos uploaded by that user ID and all photos uploaded by any user that have that user tagged in them. Said images, photos, and videos shall include all associated geotags whether derived from user keywords or tags or obtained from the Global Positioning System or other location services of a mobile device;

37. All activity logs for the account and all other documents showing the user's posts, keywords and tags annotated by the user, keywords and tags the user posted to other Facebook accounts and images, and the keywords and tags of other users posted to the target Facebook account and images; and
38. All linked social media accounts including, but not limited to Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Instagram accounts and the username and/or user identification number for those accounts.
39. All linked Meta accounts associated with **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)**.

Affiant asserts that the requested records and information from **Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook)**, a stored electronic communications and/or stored electronic customer data provider doing business in the State of Texas, under a contract or under the terms of a service agreement with a citizen of the State of Texas, are held in electronic storage by **Meta Platforms, Inc.** Affiant further asserts that the requested records and information will constitute evidence that a specific offense has been committed or constitute evidence that a particular person(s) committed the offense.

Affiant further requests that the service provider be ordered not to disclose the fact of this Application or potential Search Warrant as its disclosure could cause an adverse result for this ongoing investigation such as flight of the suspect, tampering with evidence, or tampering with witnesses.

II.

The stored electronic communications and/or stored electronic customer data provider is **Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook)**. Affiant knows that Meta Platforms, Inc. holds in electronic storage electronic customer data regarding Facebook because Meta Platforms, Inc. owns Facebook. **Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook)** may be contacted for service of process and execution of the search warrant requested herein by serving **Meta Platforms, Inc.** at **Attn: Law Enforcement Response Team, Meta Platforms, Inc., 1 Meta Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025.**

III.

The suspect account in question is **Meta Platforms, Inc.** and/or **Facebook** account **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)** for the time period of **January 21, 2012 to June 21, 2024.**

IV.

**AFFIDAVIT OF REQUESTING PEACE OFFICER**

**AFFIANT'S BELIEF IS BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING FACTS:**

Affiant is Texas Ranger Garrett Chapman, a licensed Peace Officer under the laws of the State of Texas. Affiant is employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) assigned to the Texas Ranger Division and has been employed with DPS for approximately nine (9) years. Affiant is licensed by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement and holds a Master Peace Officer Certification. Affiant is




responsible for conducting significant criminal investigations to include murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, officer involved shootings, crimes of public integrity, and crimes of public corruption. Affiant has received training in the detection, investigation, and apprehension of persons involved in the aforementioned offenses. Affiant has coordinated or has personally been involved in the procurement and execution of search and/ or arrest warrants, interviewing, supervising and working with cooperative individuals, as well as open and covert surveillance techniques. Affiant has led and assisted with numerous investigations that have resulted in the successful arrest and prosecution of multiple defendants for various offenses, both state and federal.

Affiant learned the following information from an affidavit prepared by Fort Bend County District Attorney's Office Investigator Evett Kelly. Affiant knows Investigator Kelly to be a licensed Texas peace officer and that Investigator Kelly has been a peace officer for 22 years. Affiant knows Investigator Kelly to be credible and reliable. Affiant further knows that Investigator Kelly obtained information from Texas Ranger Louis Caltzontzint during the course of her investigation. Affiant knows Ranger Caltzontzint is a certified Texas peace officer and has been a peace officer for over 20 years. Affiant knows Ranger Caltzontzint to be credible and reliable. The following facts were provided by Investigator Kelly to support this affidavit:

On or about October 18, 2023, Investigator Kelly received a request for investigation from Fort Bend County Commissioner of Precinct 3, Andy Meyers, hereinafter referred to as Meyers. The request concerned the identity of the source of several social media posts, including Facebook posts, directed at Taral Patel, a candidate in the Democratic primary for Fort Bend County Commissioner Precinct 3. The request for investigation included a press release issued by Taral Patel which displayed a collage of "racist" social media posts, which Investigator Kelly observed included Facebook screenshots. Investigator Kelly observed that the press release concealed many of the usernames. Investigator Kelly met with Meyers who stated that he reviewed the press release, located the original (unredacted) posts, and recognized the possible Facebook username "Antonio Scalywag". Meyers told Investigator Kelly that before Taral Patel entered the race for County Commissioner 3, "Antonio Scalywag" posted comments on social media attacking Meyers. Meyers stated to Investigator Kelly that he had hired an investigator who was unable to locate anyone in Fort Bend County named Antonio Scalywag. Meyers requested Investigator Kelly to investigate the source of the comments to determine whether one or more identities were misrepresented.

Investigator Kelly observed the press release to have been posted on or about September 18, 2023, on social media platforms Facebook (Taral Patel for Commissioner – Fort Bend County 3), Twitter (@TaralVPatel), and Instagram (Taralpateltx) (see below). Investigator Kelly compared the redacted images from the press release to the unredacted posts that were provided by Meyers and observed them to appear to be the same. Investigator Kelly observed that three of the posts included in the press release were posts by a Facebook user named Antonio Scalywag, one of which stated in part "...I am with Meyers ALL THE WAY...unlike Patel and his followers who worship Monkey and Elephant" (pictured below).






Investigator Kelly began her investigation by conducting a search of public records and law enforcement databases for the name “Antonio Scalywag” and no results returned. Investigator Kelly knows based on her training and experience that people can create Facebook profiles using fake names or false personas.

Investigator Kelly went to Facebook.com and searched for the profile “Antonio Scalywag.” Investigator Kelly located the Facebook profile for Antonio Scalywag and identified it as the same one from the press release by comparing the name and profile picture to the unredacted posts provided by Meyers. Investigator Kelly observed the posts on the Antonio Scalywag Facebook profile to be consistent with those shown to her by Meyers. Investigator Kelly observed the Facebook profile picture associated with user Antonio Scalywag to be of a white male and female, both of whom appeared to be about thirty years of age, with two children (see below). Investigator Kelly observed the described photo to be the only profile picture associated with the identity and persona of the Facebook user Antonio Scalywag.

*Antonio Scalywag Facebook profile photo as observed by Investigator Kelly and incorporated into this affidavit:*





Investigator Kelly copied the Facebook profile picture used by Antonio Scalywag into an open source internet search engine and performed a search for similar photos. From the search returns, Investigator Kelly identified another Facebook account for Patrick Ernst that contained the same photo. Investigator Kelly observed Patrick Ernst's Facebook account to have many photos depicting the same white male, many of which included the same white female, as the profile picture used by Antonio Scalywag. Additionally, in the results of the search for similar photos, Investigator Kelly observed the same photo to be linked to the website TheErnstCo.com, which advertised the services of Amy Ernst, a professional home organizer serving Needville, Texas and other areas of Fort Bend County, Texas.

Investigator Kelly conducted a search of the name Patrick Ernst using the public data website truthfinder.com. Investigator Kelly observed the results to show only one Patrick Ernst in Fort Bend County, Texas, who lived in Needville. Investigator Kelly placed a phone call to the phone number listed for the Patrick Ernst that lived in Needville and spoke to a person who identified himself to Investigator Kelly as Patrick Ernst (Ernst). Ernst told Investigator Kelly that he did have a Facebook account and that someone had previously contacted him via Facebook messenger about a person identified as Antonio Scalywag using Ernst's picture. Investigator Kelly invited Ernst to the Fort Bend County District Attorney's Office for an interview.

On or about February 2, 2024, Investigator Kelly met with Patrick Ernst, whose identity was later confirmed via a search of the law enforcement database TCIC/NCIC and official Texas Driver's License photo. Investigator Kelly observed Ernst to appear to be the person in the photo used on the Facebook account of Antonio Scalywag. Investigator Kelly showed Ernst the photo used on the Facebook account for Antonio Scalywag, and Ernst stated that the photo depicted himself and his wife. Ernst told Investigator Kelly that the photo was taken at a state park and was posted on his wife, Amy Ernst's, business website: TheErnstCo.com. Ernst told Investigator Kelly that in November 2023, someone named Bassam Syed sent him a direct message on Facebook stating that Antonio Scalywag was using Ernst's photo. Ernst also showed Investigator Kelly the message from Bassam Syed and Investigator Kelly observed it was consistent with Ernst's statement.

Investigator Kelly showed Ernst the Facebook posts by Antonio Scalywag used in the press release provided to Investigator Kelly by Andy Meyers and Ernst denied writing them. During the meeting with Ernst, Investigator Kelly accessed the online Facebook account for Antonio Scalywag and showed Ernst the profile, the posts, and the list of friends on the profile. Ernst told Investigator Kelly that he did not send any of the messages or make any of the posts associated with his photo and the name Antonio Scalywag. Ernst told Investigator Kelly that the photo of him on Antonio Scalywag's profile was obtained and used without his consent and that he considered the comments by Antonio Scalywag, using his photo, to be harmful to Ernst's reputation.

On or about February 13, 2024, Investigator Kelly issued a subpoena to Meta Platforms, Inc. for the subscriber information for the "Antonio Scalywag" Facebook account. On or about March 14, 2024, Investigator Kelly received the Facebook records from Meta Platforms, Inc. Investigator Kelly reviewed the records, which showed the registered email address for the Facebook user "Antonio Scalywag" as [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com).

On or about March 19, 2024, Investigator Kelly sent a subpoena to Google, LLC (Google) requesting the subscriber information for the email address [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com).



Investigator Kelly received records from Google responsive to the subpoena on or about April 10, 2024. Investigator Kelly reviewed the records and observed the following subscriber information: Taral Patel, [REDACTED] TX 77494, and phone number [REDACTED]. Using the Fort Bend County Appraisal District (FBCAD) website, Investigator Kelly searched the property address [REDACTED] Texas 77494, and saw that it was a residence owned by Atula Patel and Vipul H Patel. Investigator Kelly observed that the residence was reported as their homestead.

Using law enforcement databases, Investigator Kelly located a current Texas Driver's License for Taral Patel. Investigator Kelly observed that Texas Driver's License No. [REDACTED] was issued to Taral Vipul Patel, and listed his emergency contacts as Atula Patel and Vipul Patel. Investigator Kelly observed his mailing address as [REDACTED], Texas 77494. Investigator Kelly observed in Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) records from Ranger Caltzontzint that prior to changing his address on 09-08-2023, Taral Patel's physical address was listed as [REDACTED] Texas 77494. Investigator Kelly positively identified Taral Vipul Patel to be the same Taral Patel who is the candidate running for County Commissioner Precinct 3 by comparing the Texas Driver's License photo to campaign photos identifying him at <https://www.taralpateltx.com>.

Investigator Kelly observed that the Google subpoena return for the account [moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com) dated April 10, 2024, also included billing information. Investigator Kelly observed it to list the account holder as Taral Patel and include the 16-digit Visa card number [REDACTED]. Investigator Kelly searched the 16-digit Visa card number using the open source search engine Binlist.net and identified the card issuer as JP Morgan Chase Bank. On or about April 12, 2024, Investigator Kelly sent a subpoena to JP Morgan Chase Bank for records identifying the customer that was issued card number [REDACTED]. On or about May 2, 2024, Investigator Kelly received the JP Morgan Chase Bank produced records responsive to the subpoena. Investigator Kelly observed the records to identify the owner of the 16-digit visa card linked to [moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com) as:

Customer Name: TARAL PATEL  
Customer Address: [REDACTED] TX 77494-5971  
Phone Number: [REDACTED]  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Date of Birth: [REDACTED]

Investigator Kelly observed the JP Morgan Chase Bank records to further identify the customer by User ID: "taralvpatel05" and Email Address: [taralvpatel@gmail.com](mailto:taralvpatel@gmail.com). Investigator Kelly knows that this email address is linked to Taral Patel as well as other target suspect emails in this investigation (see below). Investigator Kelly observed credit card transactions in and around the Houston area, and in the Washington, D.C. and Arlington, VA areas beginning in August 2021.

Investigator Kelly observed the Google subpoena return also included the following online activity information:

Name: Tvpat Tvpat  
Email: [moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com)  
Last Updated Date: 2024-01-16  
Last Logins: 2024-01-16, 2024-01-04, 2023-05-17



Account Recovery SMS: + [REDACTED] [US]  
IP Activity:

Timestamp	IP Address	Activity Type
2024-01-16 03:46:54 Z	2601:2c2:981:7c50:d3b1:beaa:1e13:8847	Login

Investigator Kelly searched the IP address 2601:2c2:981:7c50:d3b1:beaa:1e13:8847 using an open source search engine and learned that it belonged to Comcast in the Houston Metro area. Investigator Kelly sent a subpoena to Comcast requesting the subscriber information for the IP address. On May 21, 2024, Investigator Kelly received records from Comcast responsive to the subpoena. Investigator Kelly reviewed the records and learned that the subscriber to the Comcast account was Atula Patel, [REDACTED] Texas 77494. Investigator Kelly noted that subscriber information matched the Texas Driver's License return of Taral Vipul Patel.

Noting the Account Recovery SMS (phone number) associated with the email [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com) was [REDACTED] Investigator Kelly sent a subpoena to Google on or about April 19, 2024, requesting it to identify all emails that use phone number [REDACTED] as the Account Recovery SMS. On May 20, 2024, Google responded to the subpoena, Investigator Kelly reviewed the records and observed that phone number [REDACTED] was the recovery phone number for the following email accounts: [taral.fbc@gmail.com](mailto:taral.fbc@gmail.com), [taralvpatel@gmail.com](mailto:taralvpatel@gmail.com), [moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:moutaingoatzrule@gmail.com), and [info@kpgeorge.com](mailto:info@kpgeorge.com). Investigator Kelly knows based on her training and experience that the acronym SMS means short message service, which means a cellular/mobile phone device capable of sending/receiving text messages.

On May 7, 2024, Investigator Kelly obtained two search warrants from Judge T. Carter, of the 400<sup>th</sup> District Court, Fort Bend County, Texas in the 268 Judicial District of Texas. One warrant was to Google for the contents of the [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com) account. The other warrant was to Meta Platforms Inc. (Facebook), for the contents of the Antonio Scalywag Facebook account.

On or about May 14, 2024, Investigator Kelly received records from Google, in response to the [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com) search warrant. Investigator Kelly reviewed the records and observed that the device associated with [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com) was a Pixel 6 Pro mobile phone device. Investigator Kelly also observed the Google records to show that in addition to [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com), the Pixel 6 Pro mobile phone device was associated with several other email accounts, including but not limited to: [taralvpatel@gmail.com](mailto:taralvpatel@gmail.com), [electkpgeorge@gmail.com](mailto:electkpgeorge@gmail.com), [info@kpgeorge.com](mailto:info@kpgeorge.com), [taralfbc@gmail.com](mailto:taralfbc@gmail.com), [tpatel@intuitivegc.com](mailto:tpatel@intuitivegc.com), [kpgeorge@kpgeorge.com](mailto:kpgeorge@kpgeorge.com), [info@taralpateltx.com](mailto:info@taralpateltx.com). Investigator Kelly knows from her investigation and review of campaign materials published by Taral Patel, that Taral Patel worked as Chief of Staff for K.P. George, County Judge for Fort Bend County, Texas at or near the time the Google records were created. Investigator Kelly looked at the contact information available on Taral Patel for Commissioner of Precinct 3 Campaign's website (<https://www.taralpateltx.com>) and saw that the email published on the website was [info@taralpateltx.com](mailto:info@taralpateltx.com).

Investigator Kelly continued her review of the records from Google in response to the [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com) search warrant and saw an email from Facebook to Antonio



Scalywag dated July 15, 2022 that read in part “Hi Antonio, Your Facebook password was reset on Friday, July 15, 2022 at 9:54 AM (EDT) Device: Pixel 6 Pro IP address: 38.42.1.196”.

Investigator Kelly used an open-source search engine to look up the IP address 38.42.1.196 and learned that it belonged to Starry, Inc. in the Washington, D.C. Metro area. Investigator Kelly sent a subpoena to Starry Inc. requesting subscriber information for the IP address. On or about May 21, 2024, Investigator Kelly received records from Starry Inc. responsive to the subpoena. Investigator Kelly reviewed the records and observed the following subscriber information: Name: Taral Patel, Address: [REDACTED] Arlington, VA 22209, Phone: [REDACTED], Length of Service: 06/27/2022 to 05/31/2023, and Email: [Taralvpatel@gmail.com](mailto:Taralvpatel@gmail.com). Investigator Kelly noted that the email and phone number for this account are associated with the identity of Taral Patel across multiples credible sources, including but not limited to DPS and JP Morgan Chase.

On or about May 16, 2024, Investigator Kelly reviewed a press release from Fort Bend County Judge K.P. George from February 22, 2021, that stated Taral Patel had accepted a job in Washington, D.C. and his last day would be March 2, 2021. Investigator Kelly also used open source search tools and found a commencement program for the May 19, 2023 graduation ceremony for George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, which listed Taral Patel as a graduate. Investigator Kelly knows based on information distributed by Taral Patel’s campaign that Taral Patel asserts he worked in Washington, D.C. for the Federal Government and attended evening classes at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School.

Investigator Kelly noted that the phone number [REDACTED] was the account recovery phone number for multiple emails associated with Taral Patel, and was also associated with the subscriber Taral Patel in Arlington, VA. Investigator Kelly conducted an open source search of the phone number [REDACTED] and found that it is a cell phone number registered to T-Mobile. On or about May 16, 2024, Investigator Kelly issued a subpoena to T-Mobile for the subscriber information for phone number [REDACTED]. On May 24, 2024, T-Mobile responded to the subpoena and Investigator Kelly observed that the subscriber associated with cell phone number [REDACTED] is Atula Patel, [REDACTED], Texas 77494.

On May 22, 2024, Investigator Kelly received records from Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook) in response to the search warrant for the Antonio Scalywag Facebook account. Investigator Kelly reviewed the records and observed that the photo of Patrick Ernst was uploaded to Antonio Scalywag’s profile on or about October 20, 2022, from a mobile device using IP address: 38.42.1.196. Investigator Kelly knew based on her investigation that this was a Starry, Inc. IP address that was registered to Taral Patel in Arlington, VA. Investigator Kelly located in the Facebook records the three posts which were used in Taral Patel’s press release on September 18, 2023. Investigator Kelly also observed in the Facebook records a threat made to another user by Antonio Scalywag. From Investigator Kelly’s review, it appeared that Antonio Scalywag, after sending the threatening Facebook message deleted the message. Investigator Kelly observed before the Facebook message was deleted, it had been preserved by the recipient and sent back to Antonio Scalywag as a media message.

Investigator Kelly continued her review of the records from Meta Platforms, in response to the Antonio Scalywag search warrant and observed the I.P. Address 52.129.6.150 multiple times from September 13, 2013 to February 12, 2024. Investigator Kelly searched the IP address in an open source search engine and learned it belonged to the internet service provider EnTouch



powered by Astound. Investigator Kelly requested the subscriber information for the I.P. address 52.129.6.150, and on June 19, 2024, learned that the I.P. address returned to Telfair Lofts, [REDACTED] 77479. Investigator Kelly noted this address matched the address listed on Taral Patel's driver's license.

On or about June 12, 2024, Affiant informed Investigator Kelly that Taral Vipul Patel was arrested pursuant to Arrest Warrants # 6-11-24 AW1 and 6-11-24 AW2 signed June 11, 2024, by Judge Chad Bridges of the 458<sup>th</sup> District Court in Fort Bend County, Texas. Affiant made location of the arrest and collected a black Google brand cell phone from Taral Patel which was later identified as a Google Pixel 6 Pro. Affiant learned from Texas Highway Patrol Trooper Abraham Pineda, who Affiant believes to be credible and reliable, that Taral Patel confirmed the last four digits of the cell phone number to be [REDACTED]. On June 12, 2024, Judge Bridges issued a search warrant for the seized Pixel 6 Pro phone belonging to Taral Patel. Affiant transported the seized phone to the Texas Department of Public Safety Criminal Investigations Division Special Agent (SA) Andrew Lott who forensically examined the phone.

Affiant learned from SA Andrew Lott that a preliminary device report was rendered during the examination of the Pixel 6 Pro device belonging to Taral Patel, and that said report contained user accounts and associated URLs that were stored on the Pixel 6 Pro phone. Affiant observed in the preliminary device report for the Pixel 6 Pro belonging to Taral Patel a user account listed with the email address of [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com) with the following information:

#	Source	Account Name	User name	Service Type	Creation time	Entries
26	Chrome		<a href="mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com">theonlydangerdog@gmail.com</a>	<a href="https://myaccount.google.com">https://myaccount.google.com</a>	3/31/2018 1:38:59 AM (UTC+0)	

Affiant also observed within Taral Patel's Pixel 6 Pro preliminary device report a user account associated with both the e-mail address [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com) and the URL for Facebook with the following information:

#	Source	Account Name	User name	Service Type	Creation time	Entries
133	Chrome		<a href="mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com">theonlydangerdog@gmail.com</a>	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/">https://www.facebook.com/</a>	2/18/2019 1:44:27 AM (UTC+0)	

Affiant learned from Investigator Holly Green, a licensed peace officer employed by the Fort Bend County District Attorney's Office, that a subpoena was sent to Meta Platforms, Inc. [which includes Facebook account information] requesting subscriber information for the account associated with the email [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com). Affiant reviewed the Meta subscriber records sent in response to that subpoena and learned that the e-mail address [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com) was associated to the Facebook account: Target **100003382454594**, user name **Jane Donnie** with a date range listed as 2018-01-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-06-21 23:59:59 UTC. Affiant also observed that within the Meta subscriber records for [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com), the **Jane Donnie** Facebook account, Target **100003382454594** had a registration date of **2012-01-21 07:36:42 UTC** and a closure date of **2024-02-28 01:32:21 UTC**. Affiant also observed in the same Meta [Facebook] records associated with **Jane Donnie**,







Family Name:  
e-Mail: [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com)  
Alternate e-Mails: [taralpatel05@hotmail.com](mailto:taralpatel05@hotmail.com)

Affiant referred to the preliminary device report rendered from the forensic extraction of the Pixel 6 Pro belonging to Taral Patel and observed the following user account information that appeared to be the same e-mail address used as an alternate e-mail for [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com):

#	Source	Account Name	User name	Service Type	Creation time	Entries
233	Chrome		<a href="mailto:taralpatel05@hotmail.com">taralpatel05@hotmail.com</a>	<a href="https://sites.utexas.edu/">https://sites.utexas.edu/</a>	8/30/2014 6:37:46 PM (UTC+0)	

Affiant further reviewed the Google subscriber records for [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com) provided by Investigator Holly Green, and observed in the records that the account was created on 2008-11-05 23:27:11 Z. Affiant also observed in the record returns provided by Investigator Holly Green from Google for [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com) was account information for Google Pay, and within the Google Pay Subscriber information observed the following account information:

Bank Name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.  
Country of Issue Alphabetical: USA  
Previous Customer Initiated Card Authentication Verification or Payment Pending Instrument Verification ID: [REDACTED]  
Previous Customer Initiated Card Authentication Verification or Payment Transaction ID: [REDACTED]  
Instrument Creation Time: 2019-12-25 19:28:56 UTC

Account Owner Information

Account Holder Name: Taral Patel

Complete Postal Address

Phone Number Attached to Address: [REDACTED]  
Postal Code Number: 77054  
Administrative Area Name: TX  
Locality Name: Houston  
Address Line: [REDACTED]  
Address Line: [REDACTED]  
Recipient Name: Taral Patel

Affiant recognized within the Google subscriber records for [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com), the phone number of + [REDACTED] as the same number identified as belonging to Taral Patel, associated with Taral Patel's Pixel 6 Pro phone device, the same phone number within Google subscriber information and recovery phone number for [mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com](mailto:mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com), [taral.fbc@gmail.com](mailto:taral.fbc@gmail.com), [taralvpatel@gmail.com](mailto:taralvpatel@gmail.com), and [info@kpgeorge.com](mailto:info@kpgeorge.com).

Additionally, Affiant viewed the Google Billing Information received by Investigator Holly Green in response a subpoena for Google subscriber information for account [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com) and

observed within the Google Pay Billing information records for theonlydangerdog@gmail.com the following:

Customer Overview

Customer Id: [REDACTED]  
Payments Profile ID: [REDACTED]  
Customer Type: INDIVIDUAL  
Customer Display Name: Taral Patel

Instrument 0

Customer Id: [REDACTED]  
Instrument Id: [REDACTED]  
Creation time: 2019-12-25 19:28:56 UTC  
Financial Account Type: FINANCIAL\_ACCOUNT\_TYPE\_CARD  
Account Holder Name 0: Taral Patel  
Billing Name 0: Taral Patel  
Card Class: CARD\_CLASS\_CREDIT  
Card Scheme: VISA  
Is Corporate Card: false  
Is Credit Card Prepaid: TRI\_STATE\_NO  
Instrument Issuer Region: US  
Account Number: [REDACTED]

Affiant observed that the Account Number listed within the Google Pay Billing information records for theonlydangerdog@gmail.com for Instrument 0 was for a 'VISA' card with "Account Number [REDACTED]" Affiant recalls in a review of the above information from Investigator Kelly that the payment information listed in the Google account records for mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com was also a Visa Card of the same number: [REDACTED]. Affiant also recalls that within the JP Morgan Chase Bank records for Visa Card Number [REDACTED] which were received by Investigator Kelly, list the Customer name as: Taral Patel, with Customer Address: [REDACTED] TX 77494-5971, Phone Number: [REDACTED] SSN #: [REDACTED] and Date of Birth: [REDACTED] Affiant observed the payment information for both Google accounts of theonlydangerdog@gmail.com and mountaingoatzrule@gmail.com to have payment linked to the phone number and JP Morgan Chase account associated with Taral Patel.

Affiant learned from Ranger Caltzontzint that he developed an investigative lead through use of a law enforcement facial recognition database. Ranger Caltzontzint indicated that the profile photo used by the Facebook account of "Jane Donnie" pictured above was a photo of an individual named Gregg White, who is a realtor with ReMax Realty residing in Jamison, Pennsylvania.

Affiant learned the following from Ranger Caltzontzint that on or about June 20, 2024, at approximately 11:33AM, Ranger Caltzontzint conducted an interview with the individual identified as Gregg White (DOB: [REDACTED]) who resides in Jamison, Pennsylvania. Gregg White informed Ranger Caltzontzint that he has both a personal and Facebook Account. Ranger Caltzontzint showed Gregg White the post made by Jane Donnie including the user profile picture, and Gregg White confirmed that the user profile picture in the "Jane Donnie" post was a picture of himself. Gregg White read the contents of the post and informed Ranger Caltzontzint that this is not his Facebook account, and that he did not post this statement, nor did he give permission to anyone to use his photograph on any Facebook account, nor would he give anyone permission to use his photo on a Facebook post of this nature. Gregg White



informed Ranger Caltzontzint that he found the post to be offensive in nature. Gregg White informed Ranger Caltzontzint that he does not know an individual named Taral Patel, and does not have knowledge of anything related to Fort Bend County, Texas. Gregg White informed Ranger Caltzontzint the photo, which was used without his permission by the “Jane Donnie” account, was a photo that he would have used at an early time in his real estate career, possibly on a real estate website in relation to his real estate business. Gregg White informed Ranger Caltzontzint that he considers the unauthorized use of his photo in the Facebook post by “Jane Donnie” as well as the contents of the post to be harmful to his reputation.

Fort Bend County District Attorney’s Office Investigator Katelyn Boga reviewed the forensic digital extraction of the Pixel 6 Pro cellular device belonging to Taral Patel and confirmed that within the device report were user accounts attributed to the device as pictured below:

*\*Screenshot of user accounts within Taral Patel’s Pixel 6 Pro device from Investigator Katelyn Boga, incorporated to the affidavit hereinafter\**

		User Accounts	Username	
5	●	User Accounts	Username	theonlydangerdog@gmail.com
6	●	User Accounts	Username	theonlydangerdog
7	●	User Accounts	Username	theonlydangerdog@gmail.com
8	●	User Accounts	Username	theonlydangerdog@gmail.com
9	●	User Accounts	Username	theonlydangerdog@gmail.com

Affiant knows that account information on social media platforms including Facebook, can be changed while the account is active, including but not limited to changing the user name, vanity name, Facebook URL ‘facebook.com/username’, profile pictures, payment methods, address, and e-mail address, which can included user contact information for the account. Affiant seeks information starting from the recorded date of registration on January 21, 2012 related to the Facebook account for “Jane Donnie” which is registered with e-mail address [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com).

Based upon all the foregoing information, Affiant believes that a search of the **Facebook** account **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier [theonlydangerdog@gmail.com](mailto:theonlydangerdog@gmail.com); Target 100003382454594)** would yield pertinent information that would constitute evidence of the offense(s) of Misrepresentation of Identity (Texas Elections Code 255.005) and Online Impersonation (Texas Penal Code 33.07) or evidence that a particular person(s) committed the offense of Misrepresentation of Identity (Texas Elections Code 255.005) and Online Impersonation (Texas Penal Code 33.07).

Based upon the foregoing information, there is probable cause to believe that evidence of Misrepresentation of Identity and Online Impersonation will be found within Meta Platforms, Inc. (specifically the social media platform of Facebook). Based on Affiant’s training and experience, Affiant has reason to believe that by securing the requested information related to this Meta Platforms, Inc. (specifically the social media platform of Facebook) account will lead Affiant to information important to this criminal investigation and subsequent prosecution of the crimes stated within this affidavit.

Subscriber information that includes names, e-mail address, recent logins and time stamps for activity would identify the suspect(s). Expanded subscriber content like profile contact information, status



updates, shares, notes, wall postings, and friend listings would help identify the suspect(s) further and possible associates in the crime pictured with the suspect(s). Stored active session content including the date, time, device, IP addresses, machine cookies and browser information stored by Facebook would help identify how and where the suspect(s) use his/her phone or computer. Current and past address(es) associated with the account will help identify where the suspect(s) reside to place them at or near the crimes. Alternate names on the account will help further identify the suspect(s). Third-party applications or "apps" that use Facebook, link to Facebook, or that pull information from Facebook, will be helpful in identifying further information the suspect(s) used to commit the offenses. History of conversations the suspect(s) had on Facebook could be evidence of coordinating the events of the crime or posts. Places the account holder has checked into will help identify the locations the suspect(s) have been to track and coordinate movements establishing that a suspect was in control of the account at the time the posts were made. Credit card information that may be stored with Facebook could be evidence of the identity of the suspect(s). E-mail addresses connected to the account would be evidence to help further identify the suspect(s). Events the account holder has been invited to or joined will be evidence of how the suspect(s) lives or help identify additional suspects. Friends the account holder has indicated as family would help identify the suspect(s)' connections and possibly identify the suspect(s) who are thus unidentified. The list of followers could be evidence of accomplices in the crime. The list of individuals and accounts the suspect(s) follows could help identify accomplices. A list of the account holder's friends could be evidence of accomplices. Any location data including check-ins, addresses, pins, likes of businesses that are kept by Facebook would be evidence of the suspect(s)' movements and actions before, during, and after the commission of the crimes. A list of accounts the account holder has linked to Facebook or apps the account holder has given Facebook (Meta Platforms, Inc.) access to could provide evidence of additional applications the suspect(s) used to coordinate and execute the offense. The list of IP Addresses used to login and logouts to this Meta Platforms, Inc. account will provide evidence of account holder and location information. Archived messages could be evidence of communications with accomplices. Mobile phone numbers associated to the account would point to potential devices the suspect(s) used in the commission of the crime. Photographs and videos posted to the account help identify the suspect(s) and how the suspect(s) looked during periods the suspect(s) committed the crime, and could be evidence of the crime itself. The associated information gathered by Meta Platforms, Inc. like date, time, GPS location, and device used including serial numbers, makes, and models to the upload images and videos would help identify devices used to help commit the crime. Additional screen names the account holder has linked to the account could lead to additional evidence about the suspect(s) or accomplices with the suspect(s).

Affiant has both training and experience in the investigation of crimes involving the use of stored electronic communications and stored electronic customer data services. Affiant knows the following through his training, experience, and conversations with other knowledgeable law enforcement officers:

1. Affiant knows from training and experience that social media records such as those held by **Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook)** may support evidence of current, on-going, future, and past criminal activity. Affiant knows that such information may be used to identify victims, witnesses, associates, and co-conspirators.
2. From Affiant's review of publicly available information provided by Facebook about its service, including Facebook's "Terms of Use" policy, "Data" policy, and "Information for Law Enforcement", Affiant is aware of the following about Facebook and about the information collected and retained by **Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook)**. Facebook is owned by Meta Platforms, Inc. and operates a free-access social-networking website of the same name that can be accessed at <http://www.facebook.com>. Facebook allows users to create their own profile pages,



which can include a short biography, a photo of themselves, and other information. Users can access Facebook through the Facebook website or by using a special electronic application (“app”) created by the company that allows users to access the service through a mobile device or tablet.

3. Facebook permits users to post photos to their profiles on Facebook and otherwise share photos with others on Facebook, as well as certain other social-media services, including Flickr, Instagram, Tumblr, and Twitter. When posting or sharing a photo on Facebook, a user can add to the photo, a caption; various “tags” that can be used to search for the photo (e.g., a user made add the tag #Chevy so that people interested in Chevrolet vehicles can search for and find the photo); location information; and other information. A user can also apply a variety of “filters” or other visual effects that modify the look of the posted photos. In addition, Facebook allows users to make comments on posted photos, including photos that the user posts or photos posted by other users of Facebook. Users can also “like” photos.
4. Upon creating a Facebook account, a user must register an email address and create an account password. This information is collected and maintained by Facebook. Facebook also requests users to provide basic identity and contact information upon registration and also allows users to provide additional identity information for their user profile. This information may include the user’s full name, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers, as well as potentially other personal information provided directly by the user to Facebook. Once an account is created, users may also adjust various privacy and account settings for the account on Facebook. Facebook collects and maintains this information.
5. Social networking sites, including Facebook, which allow users to establish online accounts, create profiles, and invite others to access profiles as friends are susceptible to fabrication and manipulation.
6. Facebook allows users to have “friends,” which are other individuals with whom the user can share information without making the information public. Friends on Facebook may come from either contact lists maintained by the user, other third-party social media websites and information, or searches conducted by the user on Facebook profiles. Facebook collects and maintains this information.
7. Facebook also allows users to “follow” or “Friend” another user, which means that they receive updates about posts made by the other user. Users may also “unfollow” or “Unfriend” users, that is, stop following them or block them, which prevents the blocked user from following that user. Facebook also allows users to post and share various types of user content, including photos, videos, captions, comments, and other materials. Facebook collects and maintains user content that users post to Facebook or shared through Facebook.
8. Facebook users may send photos, videos, and messages to select individuals or groups via Facebook Messenger. Information sent via Facebook Messenger does not appear in a user’s feed, search history, or profile. Users on Facebook may also search Facebook for other users or particular types of photos or other content.
9. For each user, Facebook also collects and retains information, called “log file” information, every time a user requests access to Facebook, whether through a web page or through an app. Among the log file information that Facebook’s servers automatically record is the particular web requests, any Internet Protocol (“IP) address associated with the request, type of browser used, any



referring/exit web pages and associated URLs, pages viewed, dates and times of access, and other information.

10. Facebook also collects and maintains “cookies,” which are small text files containing a string of numbers that are placed on a user’s computer or mobile device and that allows Facebook to collect information about how a user uses Facebook. For example, Facebook uses cookies to help users navigate between pages efficiently, to remember preferences, and to ensure advertisements are relevant to a user’s interests.
11. Facebook also collects information on the particular devices used to access Facebook. In particular, Facebook may record “device identifiers,” which includes data files and other information that may identify the particular electronic device that was used to access Facebook. Facebook also collects data from device settings including GPS location, camera, photos, and more specific device identifies such as IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity), MEID (Mobile Equipment Identity), and UDID (Unique Device Identifier).
12. Facebook also collects other data associated with user content. For example, Facebook collects any “hashtags” associated with user content (i.e., keywords used), “geotags” that mark the location of a photo and which may include GPS data such as latitude and longitude information, comments on photos, and other information.
13. Facebook also may communicate with the user, by email or otherwise. Facebook collects and maintains copies of communications between Facebook and the user.
14. As explained herein, information stored in connection with a Facebook account may provide crucial evidence of the “who, what, why, when, where, and how” of the criminal conduct under investigation, thus enabling investigators to establish and prove each element or alternatively, to exclude the innocent from further suspicion.
15. A Facebook user’s account activity, IP log, stored electronic communications, and other data retained by Facebook, can indicate who has used or controlled the Facebook account. This “user attribution” evidence is analogous to the search for “indicia of occupancy” while executing a search warrant at a residence. For example, profile contact information, direct messaging logs, shared photos and videos, and captions (and the data associated with the foregoing, such as geo-location, date and time) may be evidence of who used or controlled the Facebook account at a relevant time. Further, Facebook account activity can show how and when the account was accessed or used. For example, as described herein, Facebook logs the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from which users access their accounts along with the time and date. By determining the physical location associated with the logged IP addresses, investigators can understand the chronological and geographic context of the account access and use relating to the crime under investigation. Such information allows investigators to understand the geographic and chronological context of Facebook access, use, and events relating to the crime under investigation.
16. Additionally, Facebook builds geo-location into some of its services. Geo-location allows, for example, users to “tag” their location in posts and Facebook “friends” to locate each other. This geographic and timeline information may tend to either inculpate or exculpate the Facebook account owner. Last, Facebook account activity may provide relevant insight into the Facebook account owner’s state of mind as it relates to the offense under investigation. For example,



information on the Facebook account may indicate the owner's motive and intent to commit a crime (e.g., information indicating a plan to commit a crime), or consciousness of guilt (e.g., deleting account information in an effort to conceal evidence from law enforcement).

Affiant knows from his training, experience, and consultation with other certified peace officers that Meta Platforms, Inc., located at 1 Meta Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025, is a provider of an electronic communications service/remote computing service. Affiant knows from his training and experience that this company provides access to a worldwide computer network, commonly known as the Internet, to individuals and/or other users who have a subscription to, membership with, or affiliation with their company, organization or commercial service. Meta Platforms, Inc., also provides web hosting, e-mail/messaging services, image/video storage services, access solutions, etc. to its customers in which Meta Platforms, Inc., reserves and/or maintains computer disk storage space on its own computer system servers for the use of the subscribers/customers/users associated with its company. Information contained on this previously mentioned storage space is Electronic Customer Data as defined in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (T.C.C.P.) Chapter 18 and may include electronic communications (commonly known as e-mails and or messages) between subscriber(s) and other parties, graphic image and/or text files, Internet history or Internet hyperlinks, file transfer protocol logs, website access logs, programs and other types of data or information stored in electronic form(s). Providers of electronic communications services/remote computing services, such as Meta Platforms, Inc., also maintain records pertaining to the individuals and/or other users who have subscriber accounts with their company. This information can include registration information, account application information, credit card or other billing information, account access information, user logon information (including secondary user log on names), account usage reports, e-mail transaction information, news group access and posting information and other information both in computer data and written record format that records the activities of these accounts relating to the subscriber's use of the services offered by the provider.

Affiant knows from his training, experience, and consultation with other law enforcement officers that an I.P. address is a unique number assigned to a computer when that computer accesses the Internet. I.P. addresses allow computers on the Internet to locate, contact, and communicate with other computers via the Internet network. An I.P. address refers to a unique number used by a computer to access the Internet; it is unique in the sense that no two users can have the exact same I.P. address at the same time. Every computer or machine that is on the Internet has a unique I.P. address. If a computer or machine does not have an I.P. address, it is not really on the Internet. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are companies that provide individuals and other companies with access to the Internet, commonly for a fee, through telephone, cable, or satellite connections. Some ISPs also offer an extensive online array of services of their own apart from the rest of the Internet, such as e-mail access, newsgroup access, instant message chat, etc. Companies such as Internet Service Providers or Web Hosting Services doing business on the Internet commonly obtain a block or series of I.P. addresses. Using a specific type of software, the I.P. address assigned to the computer can be subsequently traced to the Internet Company providing the I.P. address. A request to the ISP, usually in the form of a subpoena, can reveal the subscription information that the ISP receives when establishing service to the customer, including name, billing address, address of service, and form and method of payment for the service. Affiant knows through his training and experience that an I.P. address is an accurate technique to find the method of Internet connection for an individual accessing the Internet. The service providers for I.P. addresses keep accurate records that can be traced back to specific accounts if they are provided with accurate dates and times of use. Affiant is aware that some I.P. address may be static and that static I.P. address do not change periodically. Corresponding to a particular IP Address is the Universal Resource Locator (hereinafter referred to as a URL), which is the address of the site in a text format. Uniform Resource Locator (URL) specifies the



location of and is the address of a file or resource accessible on the Internet. An IP address may look something like "67.15.250.7." A URL may look something like <http://www.yahoo.com>.

As a result of the above-mentioned training and experience, Affiant has learned that people can use these social media profiles to mask their true identities and often utilize several different profiles to engage in acts of misrepresentation of identity and online impersonation.

By nature of Meta Platforms, Inc. being an Internet service provider, it is realized that many other individuals, organizations, businesses, and other entities utilize this company's services and have no association with the subject investigation. These other unnamed individuals, organizations, businesses, and other entities may have various amounts of information maintained in various forms with Meta Platforms, Inc. with a reasonable expectation of privacy. It is Affiant's intent that the search conducted at Meta Platforms, Inc. be as least intrusive as possible to complete this search as it relates the offense(s) Misrepresentation of Identity and Online Impersonation. Further, it is Affiant's intent to use whatever means or methodology on hand to conduct this search with limited or no interruption of the service provided to these other unnamed individuals. It is for these reasons that Affiant requests that Meta Platforms, Inc. locate and isolate the above named information on their servers and make a copy of such information in a readable format to provide to Affiant for review as part of this investigation.

Affiant further requests that Meta Platforms, Inc. be precluded from disclosing the existence of this warrant to any person. Affiant believes that a serious adverse result as defined by T.C.C.P Article 18B.501(c) would arise if Meta Platforms, Inc. was not precluded from notification to any customer/subscriber. Specifically, Affiant believes that because this case involves one or more suspects masking their identities online that disclosure would lead to tampering with witnesses and evidence.

Affiant hereby notifies Meta Platforms, Inc., that an executed affidavit is required and requests that Meta Platforms, Inc. be ordered to provide said executed affidavit along with any responsive customer data, contents of communications, and other information produced in compliance with the warrant.

All information noted in this affidavit for search warrant has been related to Affiant by the person(s) and/or source(s) attributed or referenced. Affiant further believes in good faith that the information provided herein to be true, correct, and worthy of credibility. Because the sole purpose of this affidavit is to establish probable cause that a criminal offense has occurred, not every relevant fact known to me, or to other investigators, is included within. Rather, only those facts necessary to establish probable cause have been discussed.

An exact copy of the warrant will be served to Meta Platforms, Inc. personnel, either by telephonic facsimile transmission, electronic mail (email) transmission, or by uploading the warrant to the provider's law enforcement compliance portal, who will be directed to produce those account records and communications in its possession. The information requested should be readily accessible to Meta Platforms, Inc. by computer search, and its production should not prove to be burdensome.

Affiant knows the disclosure of transactional and subscriber records and information is regulated by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), specifically found in Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2701, et seq. The ECPA requires the disclosure of content of an electronic communication held by an electronic communication or remote computing service pursuant to a state search warrant, and Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(g), states the presence of an officer is not required for service or execution of a search warrant issued requiring the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications service or remote computing service of the contents of an electronic communication.



Affiant believes that **Meta Platforms, Inc.** holds information and evidence related to the above described account identifier/s and that said information constitutes evidence of the above enumerated offense(s) or evidence that particular person(s) committed the above enumerated offense(s) and that it is held in electronic storage by the named service provider.

Based on the information gathered in this investigation thus far, Affiant feels that the information provided by **Meta Platforms, Inc.** for records relating to the **Facebook** account **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)** could be material to the Affiant's investigation. Based on the information set forth in this affidavit, Affiant believes specific, articulable, sufficient, and substantial facts exist establishing probable cause to believe that the requested records constitute evidence of the offense(s) of Misrepresentation of Identity (Texas Elections Code 255.005) and Online Impersonation (Texas Penal Code 33.07), or evidence that a particular person(s) committed the offense of Misrepresentation of Identity (Texas Elections Code 255.005) and Online Impersonation (Texas Penal Code 33.07).


WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Affiant respectfully requests that a warrant issue authorizing Affiant, or any other peace officer of Fort Bend County, Texas, to search the aforesaid location or compel an agent of **Meta Platforms, Inc.** to search **Facebook** account identifier **Jane Donnie (Facebook Account Identifier theonlydangerdog@gmail.com; Target 100003382454594)**, held in their custody with authority to search for and to seize any and all property, items, and contraband set out earlier in this Affidavit that constitutes evidence of the offense(s) of Misrepresentation of Identity, which is a violation of section 255.005 of the Texas Elections Code, and Online Impersonation, which is a violation of Texas Penal Code 33.07.


As required under California Penal Code § 1524.2(c), I attest that the evidence sought in this warrant is not related to an investigation into, or enforcement of, a "prohibited violation," as defined in California Penal Code § 629.51. "Prohibited violation" under that section means "any violation of law that creates liability for, or arising out of, either of the following: providing, facilitating, or obtaining an abortion that is lawful under California law; [or] intending or attempting to provide, facilitate, or obtain an abortion that is lawful under California law."

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Ranger Garrett Chapman, AFFIANT

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME on this the 25<sup>th</sup> day of July 2024.

458<sup>th</sup>

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE  
DISTRICT COURT  
FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS  
Chad Bridges  
PRINTED NAME OF JUDGE

**FILED**  
CD  
JUL 30 2024  
AT 12:01 P.M.  
  
CLERK DISTRICT COURT, FORT BEND CO., TX


WARRANT NUMBER: 7-25-24-SW1

THE STATE OF TEXAS           §  
COUNTY OF FORT BEND       §  
268TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT     §


**RETURN AND INVENTORY**


The undersigned Affiant, being a Peace Officer under the laws of Texas and being duly sworn, on oath certifies that the foregoing evidentiary search warrant came to hand on the day it was issued and that it was executed on the 29<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2024, by making the search directed therein and seizing during such search the following described property:

*Served to carrier and awaiting returns.*

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
AFFIANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, the undersigned authority, on this the 29<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2024.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NOTARY PUBLIC OF THE STATE OF TEXAS





**RECORDS PURSUANT TO THE STATE OF TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  
ARTICLE 18B.351-18B.359**

I, \_\_\_\_\_, attest, under penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the information contained in this declaration is true and correct. I am employed by Meta Platforms, Inc., and my official title is \_\_\_\_\_.

I am a custodian of records for Meta Platforms, Inc. and state that each of the records attached hereto is the original record or a true duplicate of the original record in the custody of Meta Platforms, Inc., and that I am the custodian of the attached records consisting of (pages/CDs/kilobytes). I further state that:

- A. All records attached to this certificate were made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matter set forth, by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters;
- B. Such records were kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity of Meta Platforms, Inc.; and
- C. Such records were made by Meta Platforms, Inc. as a regular practice.

I further state that this certification is intended to satisfy Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF \_\_\_\_\_

Sworn to (or affirmed) and subscribed before me this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20 \_\_, by  
(name of person making statement).

Notary Seal:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Notary Public-State of California

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Notary Typed, Printed, or Stamped

## Written Notice of Request for Business Records Affidavit

I, **Ranger Garrett Chapman**, am an authorized peace officer in the State of Texas, and I am serving a warrant for stored customer data or communication pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapters 18B.351-18B.359. In addition to the warrant, I am delivering a business records affidavit form to the provider of an electronic communications service or the provider of a remote computing service responding to the accompanying warrant.

This writing serves as notice pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (T.C.C.P.) Chapter 18B, that an executed business records affidavit is required for the records that are the subject of the warrant. Pursuant to T.C.C.P. 18B.357, the provider shall verify the authenticity of the customer data, contents of communications, and other information produced in compliance with the warrant by including with the information the affidavit form. The affidavit form is to be completed and sworn to by a person who is a custodian of the information or a person otherwise qualified to attest to its authenticity that states that the information was stored in the course of regularly conducted business of the provider and specifies whether it is the regular practice of the provider to store that information.